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Abstract. Th is study seeks to discover hidden links between Saussure’s Th ird Course of 
Lectures on General Linguistics, Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics / Philosophy of 
Mind and Alexander von Humboldt’s Cosmos. To begin with, the notion of play is employed 
to examine the interplay between our emotion, imagination and cognition, and to examine 
how such a composite of faculties serves to unify conceptualizations of communication-
modelling systems, philosophical hermeneutics and moral psychology in our times. At 
discovering a certain future-oriented and symbiotic scheme of time implied in these 
theories, the inquiry moves on to engage with certain perspectives on the evolution of our 
verbal and nonverbal capacities. Further, observations concerning the actual functioning 
of mirror neurons in humans are introduced to revise our understanding of the enactive 
power of nonverbal capacities such as feeling and imagining. Th e hypothesis made by 
neuropsychologists concerning the correlation between the mirror and sign systems 
reveals signifi cant connections between Saussure, Hegel and Humboldt: our emotions 
and imagination are as schematic and extensive as our speech acts in teaming up with 
diverse beings and pushing for new solutions and deeper understandings. Finally, this 
study draws on implications of the empowered sign-cum-mirror system for revisiting 
certain controversial issues such as the emergence of language-ready brain and the urgency 
of overcoming eeriness in our linguistic and artistic world-making. It is suggested that 
we employ our capacities as a somatosensory system so as to on the one hand observe 
the changing coordination between our body and mind, and on the other, generate 
rewarding strategies for a greater success at dealing with intriguing patterns found in 
art, nature and culture.
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1. Introduction: Why should we play with art and nature?
Th is study draws on two charming endeavours to bridge the gap between philosophical 
and evolutionary aesthetics: (1) the German polymath Alexander von Humboldt’s 
revised position concerning the usefulness of Hegel’s aesthetics (Humboldt 2009; 2010); 
(2) the Dutch sociologist Johann Huizinga’s innovative idea of defi ning an alternative 
history of aesthetics in light of the concept of play (Huizinga 1998). In the history 
of philosophical aesthetics, an essential moral issue is whether we should unify our 
perception of artwork with that of nature, and how we can possibly achieve such a union 
of our mental horizons (Hepburn 1966; Wollheim 1980; Margolis 2009). Th e presumed 
diff erence between Hegel and Humboldt – the former appears to have excluded nature 
from his inquiry while the latter regarded it as his major object of study – not only 
exemplifi es the kernel issue, but also appears highly enlightening today when considered 
in the context of empirical brain research. Neuropsychologists who aspire to draw new 
insights from empirical data have reinterpreted the relationships between our capacities: 
(1) our perception and creation of the visual arts are not necessarily dependent on the 
neural pathway of using languages (Zaidel 2010); (2) our neural functions are observed 
as a fl exible system that is adaptable to various situations (Damasio 1999; Kaag 2009). 
Th ese new insights provide the framework within which our perception is seen as 
governed and enhanced by the interplay between our consciousness, emotion and 
cognition (Pessoa 2008). By introducing the concept of play into rediscovering our 
capacity of unifying art and nature, this study on the one hand illustrates the benefi ts 
of bridging binary oppositions, and on the other hand argues for the strengths of such 
perspectives as non-reductive dialectical reasoning and nonlinear symbiotic evolution.
1.1. Unifi cation of communication-modelling system, philosophical 
hermeneutics and moral psychology
In terms of communication-modelling systems, the strength of introducing the concept 
of play into our inquiry is in recognizing a certain “emotional structure” that addressees 
develop while communicating with addressers. Juri Lotman actually put forward this 
idea in order to revise the ambivalence of emotive potential thought to exist in Roman 
Jakobson’s communication scheme (Lotman 2011). By conceptualizing the emotive 
potential as a kind of play constantly experienced between addressers and addressees, 
Lotman revised some negative impressions associated with emotions: they are not just 
a source of redundancy or a hindrance to perfect communication, but rather serve to 
integrate and elaborate on certain thoughts that occur concurrently within addressees. 
Such mental work based on the condition of multiperspectivity in our brain is thought 
to enhance the bond between the two ends of communication.
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      Play functions not only to increase the amount of information already contained in 
the art the addressers have created and the addressees are enjoying, but also to change 
the addressees’ mindsets (states of consciousness) in their processes of observing and 
interpreting. By revising the functioning of code on Jakobson’s scheme as an emotive-
cognitive composite that serves to increase information, Lotman argued that (1) some 
nonverbal and discrete entities (such as schematized images) are no less powerful than 
natural languages in shaping our understandings and modelling our sensations for the 
arts; (2) art systems are just like biological systems in the way that they both structure 
and store a huge amount of information as time evolves (Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 227; 
Lotman 2001: 203; Lotman 2011: 268). Th e kind of knowledge we gather from playful 
experiences opens up multiple yet competing truths – things that we would not be able 
to discover when applying rational and logical thinking. 
     While arguing for play as an essential spirit of our civilization, Huizinga (1998) 
recognized three types of humans – children, shamans and poets (artists) – who are 
quite capable of working out unique answers to problems by way of “pretending” to 
be serious with their imaginary objects. Successful players are believed to be operating 
on two levels: on the one hand, they are indulging in their own worlds of fancy while 
perfecting telling stories, performing rituals, or creating the arts, and on the other, they 
are communicating with their audiences by talking them into believing something 
imaginary such as the experience of encountering wolves in the forests or the pacifi cation 
of the anger of gods. Th e audiences in such scenarios are more than willing to be tricked 
so as to gain something from such communication (Huizinga 1998: 23). Just as those 
extraordinary humans who entice their audiences into play scenarios, these audiences 
have to undo a bit of their rational thinking so that they can feel the twists and turns 
in every trick and restructure their mindsets in the meantime. Th e actual functioning 
of play actually enables addressees to acquire some profound knowledge: (1) the more 
capable they are to overcome vague feelings of fear, tension or anxiety, the greater the 
resulting sense of wellbeing; (2) the more sympathetic they feel about the addressers’ 
situations, the deeper insights they will come up with into the latter’s art. 
     Basing on the dialectical mental work of acquiring knowledge through “pretending” 
or “deceiving”, Huizinga put forward the idea that we should rediscover the heuristic 
function of play, namely its strength in interdisciplinary inquiry, in the realm of aesthetics. 
He thought the rise of aesthetics towards the middle of the 18th century elucidates a 
critical turn in our way of perceiving art and nature. However, Huizinga was against 
following Friedrich Schiller’s notion of ‘play-instinct’ (Spieltrieb) to unify our innate 
qualities of feeling and shaping – he rather emphasized our conscious and eff ective 
control of mental acts in acquiring sensations of beauty and freedom (Schiller 1982: 
103, 105; Huizinga 1998: 168). Th e actual functioning of play lies in its forward-looking 
scheme of time which induces us to temporarily forget about our beliefs gathered in 
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the past while concentrating on gaining pleasure and happiness during a certain time 
span of playing here and now (Huizinga 1998: 7, 10, 201–202). 
     In the context of philosophical hermeneutics, the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(who actually benefi tted from Huizinga’s concept of play) appears to represent a strand 
that focuses on our intellectual growth – he has been accused of having underestimated 
the functioning of our emotions (Roald 2007: 78–79). However, judged in terms of his 
own philosophical tradition, Gadamer’s adoption of play gains its merits from three 
aspects: (1) he revised Kant’s notion of the aesthetic attitude of disinterestedness: we 
are encouraged to be curious and rigorous while contemplating on art and nature; 
(2) he also corrected Heidegger’s idea of a being which is deprived of “free choices”: 
as choosy players, we always consider which clue (path) to pick up when interpreting 
details; (3) he put forward the idea that we can imagine both art and nature as events of 
being (Seinsvorgängen), as if they were human beings charged with vigour and vitality. 
It is thus natural to have dialogues with them and work on mutual benefi ts, wellbeing 
and solidarity (Gadamer, Ricœur 1982; Gadamer 1994).
     Play is appreciated as an elegant and legitimate way of overcoming the gaps between 
beings. In the fi rst place, art and nature are competent or informative if some parts of 
them already attracted our attention. We then start wondering about these attractive 
details with an eye to discovering some kind of meaning or surprise. In the long run, 
recognizing certain affi  nities with them, we gradually develop an enlarged picture about 
addressers and addressees. Considering the constant comings and goings staged between 
the two ends, some new revelations are expected to appear in each communication. 
Arguably, Gadamer failed to think about the functioning of emotions: (1) our impressions 
of art and nature gathered on the fi rst encounter are actually already charged with certain 
emotions; (2) some new sensations are needed to start a new stage of inquiry; (3) certain 
feelings or aff ective reactions can be as stubborn as to stop us from making progress 
from one stage to another (Roald 2007: 105–106). In terms of both hermeneutics and 
neuropsychology, we defi nitely need to overcome some persistent feelings – deeply 
encoded in our body and mind – so as to fruitfully come up with revised understandings, 
and thus create the greatest harmony and solidarity between diverse beings.
     Th e concept of play emerges as a master trope that serves to unify art and nature 
on the same horizons. From Lotman, Huizinga and Gadamer, we gather that this is a 
matter of our own survival: we need to develop some skills and modify our thoughts 
so as to invent solutions that may enhance our wellbeing here and now. When scholars 
in our times have promoted emotions as an independent area of study – not to be 
subsumed or depleted by our abstract reasoning – particularly in the fi eld of moral 
and evolutionary psychology, they have also been looking for some kind of benefi ts or 
rewards that serve to justify our feelings (Greenspan 1998; Dissanayake 2007; Pessoa 
2008). Imagination has been claimed as a kind of morally indispensible factor that helps 
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pursue such a line of inquiry. Moreover, with the conceptualization and application of 
propositional feeling, reasoning is somewhat transformed as our capacity of fi nding 
angles or perspectives to justify our imagined, objectless, yet diverse feelings (Green-
span 1998). It is argued that imagination enables us not only to survive practical and 
daily situations, but also to fully enjoy practising and experiencing the arts. 
     Following the trend of arguing for the equally important and interactive functional 
entities of emotion and reason, we discover once again that certain play-elements are 
at work. In our course of widening horizons so as to adjust one kind of feeling into the 
others and to gain some euphoria spiralling upwards, our mind actually favours deviating 
from reality, factual beliefs or judgments as a kind of reward or benefi t. According to 
these ideas which value the profundity of emotional eff ects, our self-serving mental 
work guided by imagination elaborates on some kind of future-oriented justifi cations 
(Dissanayake 1995; Greenspan 1998; Th ornhill 2003). Instead of looking back to identify 
some true causes (reasons) of feelings, we take our emotions as a point of departure 
to push for endless discoveries of new beings, stories and solutions. Th erefore, in light 
of the aforementioned advantages of play, this study seeks to bridge the gap between 
Saussure, Hegel and Humboldt by considering some notions other than real nature. 
It relates their insights to recent surveys on two aspects: (1) the interplay between 
our visual perception and use of language in the course of unfolding and widening 
horizons; (2) the actual functioning of our emotions and imagination in teaming up 
with diverse beings.
1.2. Symbiosis of our capacities and the functioning of mirror neurons
Certain hypotheses concerning the evolution of human capacities may enable us to 
appreciate the benefi ts of introducing play into our inquiry. Some scientists who mainly 
follow Darwin believe that our ability for iconic representation is preceded by the 
emergence of language – our practices of art are deemed to have emerged late in the 
development of the Homo line (Verpooten, Nelissen 2010). It follows from this hypothesis 
that Homo sapiens started developing real art aft er they started speaking and imagining. 
Icons or symbols created for tribal identity or cohesion among pre-humans cannot be 
taken as real art (Zaidel 2010). Other scientists who adopt a nonlinear perspective rather 
defi ne our intuitive reactions of feeling, imagining, memorizing and paying attention as 
a cognitive network. Th ey believe that such a network already assisted pre-humans in 
developing some kinds of art and culture long before they started speaking – our verbal 
capacity was just a by-product in the process of developing sophisticated manual skills 
to share knowledge and to communicate (Donald 2001). In addition, this hypothesis 
considers the functioning of language as one of the play-elements that humans have 
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been applying in order to refi ne their thoughts while broadening their horizons to get 
along with people in other communities (Donald 2001: 253; Ellis 2011: 179). 
     Still other scientists wonder whether pre-humans had developed some kind 
of protolanguage on the basis of gestures and sounds they used in surviving their 
environments. Th ey are also curious about the driving force that enabled Homo sapiens 
to become “language-ready” (Arbib 2012: 157–160). Nevertheless, such a hypothesis is 
divided between standpoints of biological and cultural evolution in providing a convincing 
story about the emergence of full-fl edged languages. Even though psychologists and 
anthropologists are inclined to believe that culture has overridden biology – certain 
behaviours such as imitating, learning and using symbols among early humans may 
have assisted them in achieving a great leap in history – a measure of the cognitive and 
neuro-evolutionary benefi ts of such behaviours is under debate (Arbib 2012; D’Errico, 
Henshilwood 2011). 
     Mirror neurons have recently been claimed as the evidence that serves to unify our 
evolutionary, developmental and experiential processes within a certain time span of 
playing and imagining (Kaag 2009: 188). Th ese neurons, which in the fi rst place were 
found in monkeys’ brain area for hand control, may play a signifi cant role in governing 
the coordination of our somatosensory system such as feeling and knowing, hearing 
and speaking, watching and performing tasks with precision (Arbib 2012). Mirror 
neurons have also been recognized as the key to shortening the gap between infants 
and adults (such as the act of neonate imitation) and that between perceiving subjects 
and their environments (when arguing for a symbiotic composite of proprioceptive 
and ecological selves) (Gallagher 2006).
     By introducing the idea of play into this inquiry, we aim to dissolve binary 
oppositions of any form while allowing diverse emotions and perceptions to evolve 
with our communications with art and nature. We seek to integrate biological and 
cultural viewpoints so as to widen our horizons and revise our biases against seemingly 
strange and unpleasant signs. Actually, Humboldt showed preference to the idea that 
we are not just passively receiving stimuli but actively transforming and revising our 
impressions while travelling between native lands and faraway locations. His approach 
on the one hand revitalizes nature as a living being or a companion to work with, and 
on the other, equates the actual functioning of our language with those of our emotion 
and imagination – these faculties are thought to be equally eff ective in shaping and 
remodelling our sensory experiences (Humboldt 2010a: 63–64, 355–356). 
     Recent studies of the functioning of the mirror system appear fairly compatible with 
Humboldt’s insights concerning the cooperation between our capacities. Th e mirror 
system may help facilitate our foreseeing of possibilities or potential developments before 
we decide to take action. At the starting point of observing any kind of situation (either 
in art or in nature), patterns of our neural circuits of perceiving and imagining are not 
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very diff erent, rather, they are almost blended – they collaborate to create perspectives 
for further applications (O’Connor, Aardema 2005; Gallagher 2006; Kaag 2009). Aft er 
taking action to explore a situation (including watching, assimilating, discovering and 
interpreting sensory forms), we become more or less removed from the way we were 
in the fi rst place. Our mind and behaviour will be reshaped or restructured by details 
found in this situation – both engaging intricacies and foreboding signs may trigger a 
remapping of neural patterns in our brain (Kaag 2009).
2. Saussure, Hegel and Humboldt bridged in 
the light of hermeneutics and sign-cum-mirror system
2.1. The beautiful and the sublime induced by the hermeneutic process
Systematic approaches were highly valued back in the 19th century: Hegel sought 
to unify our capacities for the arts such as feeling and imagining, while Humboldt 
aimed to dissolve the assumed opposition between emotion and intellect as manifested 
in our judgments of cultural artefacts (Hegel 1975; Humboldt 2010a, 2010b). Hegel 
characterized our appreciation of the beautiful, the sublime and the absolute as the 
outcome of overcoming contradictions and paradoxes latent in our sensory experiences. 
In the schema by which he illustrated our signifying practices (recollection; imagination; 
memory; pure thinking), he referred to our intelligence as the key to attaining 
understanding. We should be able to (1) intuit certain propositions that artists intend 
to communicate; (2) recognize certain rules that artists have applied in unifying details 
and ideas; (3) work out our own concrete thinking which sorts out some diff erent trains 
of thoughts (Hegel 1975; 2010). Operating within this framework of communicating 
with the arts, we do not make distinctions between good and bad patterns, but focus on 
making connections and bridging gaps between them. Hegel’s approach serves to induce 
several concurrent perspectives of interpreting, contextualizing and problematizing our 
sensory experiences without forcing us to settle on any one of them.
     Humboldt’s approach to art and nature appears no less dialectical and hermeneutical 
than Hegel’s. Th e dynamic process of a perpetual to-and-fro between inquiring subjects 
and the objects of their attention may initially serve as a common ground between 
Hegel and Humboldt. Humboldt thought that we should always take advantage of the 
gaps appearing in the guises of time and space. By alternating between observing the 
exotic nature and looking into our own mind and milieu, we would be able to revise 
certain beliefs or biases and greatly widen our horizons; the more we look into and 
imagine about nature, the more pleasure and knowledge we will acquire concerning 
the hidden links between nature and culture (Humboldt 2010a). Specifi cally, Humboldt 
put forward an intriguing way of attaining the sublime: 
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Instead of turning to our religious beliefs and admiring God and his creations, we 
should keenly juxtapose diff erent plants and landscapes found in various parts of the 
world so as to contemplate our own inventions. Th e nature of the kind of illusion and 
euphoria that we are likely to gain from such a creative act is by all means dialectical: 
we are supposed to play with the greatest possible amount of sensory experiences that 
we have succeeded in putting together on the same horizons. Humboldt’s insights 
concerning a new way of perceiving the sublime – free from any tinge of metaphysical 
speculations – appear quite compatible with Hegel’s: they both considered the blurring 
of boundaries between our faculties as one of the vital traits of our scope widening and 
signifying. During their joint period of lecturing in Berlin (1820s-1830s), Hegel and 
Humboldt not only sketched some rich prospects for the study of our intelligence, but 
also managed to summarize some laws and principles that actually govern and give 
rise to our pleasure of getting along with art and nature.
2.2. Dynamic communications enacted by sign-cum-mirror system
Hegel and Humboldt discussed certain features of our intelligence and argued for a 
new way of conceiving the relationship between our verbal and nonverbal capacities – 
they both drew on the fact that we feel like bonding with art and nature before actually 
fi guring out what we can say about them. We may gather an explicit picture concerning 
the interplay between our capacities by drawing a parallel to Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
eff orts of unifying all languages, i.e. his search for a certain rule that governs our changing 
yet creative consciousness (Saussure 2006; Arbib 2012: 222, 280–281). Th e speech 
circuit as illustrated in his third course of lectures (Figure 1) may serve as a heuristic 
model of play for further bridging the gap between Hegel and Humboldt. Th e scheme 
invites us to engage with how our perceptions of verbal and nonverbal sensory forms 
converge and diverge in the course of unfolding and widening horizons.
All the methods to which I have here alluded are fi tted to enhance the love of 
the study of nature; it appears, indeed, to me, that if large panoramic buildings, 
containing a succession of such landscapes, belonging to diff erent geographical 
latitudes and diff erent zones of elevation, were erected in our cities, and, like our 
museums and galleries of paintings, thrown freely open to the people, it would be 
a powerful means of rendering the sublime grandeur of the creation more widely 
known and felt. Th e comprehension of a natural whole, the feeling of the unity 
and harmony of the Cosmos, will become at once more vivid and more generally 
diff used, with the multiplication of all modes of bringing the phenomena of 
nature generally before the contemplation of the eye and of the mind. (Humboldt 
2010b: 91) 
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Figure 1. Saussure’s communication scheme as illustrated in Emile Constantin’s notebook 
(Saussure 1993: 67).
Saussure’s model off ers two ways of thinking about sign functions: (1) some kind of 
associative centre in our brain copes with listening, speaking and reacting; (2) both 
verbal and nonverbal messages can be governed by such a centre which more or less 
manifests a unique pattern of receiving, associating and making connections between 
sensory forms. Saussure (1993: 73a) put forward the paradox that speaking – though our 
actual means of verbal communication – has no essential connections with la langue, 
the crux that preserves laws and principles. On the contrary, images such as writings 
carry more recognizable and profound ties with our associative centre (Saussure 1993: 
71a). Th e very fact that Saussure adopted “image verbale” (verbal image, later revised as 
signifi ant, signifying) to theorize one aspect of the sign entity explains his hypothesis – 
speech sounds are supposed to be somewhat transformed as images so as to reach the 
kernel of our mind. 
We can draw on two recent discoveries to verify such a harnessing and everlasting 
eff ect of images theorized by Saussure: (1) we are able to transform much of what we 
hear and what we read as part of our mental repertoire – the ability of encoding verbal 
images – in part because of the functioning of mirror neurons found in Broca’s area 
(Arbib 2012); (2) we can still create and appreciate the visual arts when suff ering from 
speech disorder or brain damage. It is argued that with such defi ciencies our art-related 
intelligence relies on alternative neuronal pathways or connections to bypass regular 
speech circuits (Zaidel 2010).
Recast in the light of the actual functioning of mirror neurons, Saussure’s scheme can 
be seen as a model of intelligence that generates not only words but also actions – our 
mind devises some “action sentences” by way of analysing, imitating, performing and 
revising others’ movements (Arbib 2012: 189–190). In comparison with chimpanzees, 
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it takes a relatively shorter time and fewer trials for us to learn a new task. Th e major 
distinction in comparison with chimpanzees is the fact that our mirror neurons have 
evolved to deal on an abstract level, which off ers potentials or meta-viewpoints for 
associating new skills (including both verbal and nonverbal performances) with old 
ones (Donald 2001: 340; Arbib 2012: 280–281). We can always foresee (imagine) how 
to do something (relating it to what we already acquired in our repertoire) and that 
we might put an end to it due to some value change in our mind (say, due to a shift  
between immediate and long-term interests). 
Such a conceptualization (emphasizing potential links between mirror neurons and 
other parts of our brain) accentuates our level of consciousness – our getting along with 
other beings is entirely in our own hands (somewhat like the Heideggerian concept of 
Zuhanden). While communicating with beings in art, culture and nature, we are not just 
copying some chunks already found there, but rather seeking to create new patterns or 
rules that would foster cohesion and cooperation within a certain time span of playing. 
In addition, our intuition and perception of other beings may not be completely clear, 
pleasant and meaningful (satiated) in the fi rst encounters – we might hesitate if we 
fail to spot some useful or familiar links to our repertoire (this said, Hegel appears to 
have done wisely having started his inquiry from our intuition and recollection). In 
order to become fully absorbed in teaming up with other beings, we need to rehearse 
in our imagination a procedure of revising and expanding our repertoire. Saussure’s 
scheme enables us to imagine the kind of dynamics that we should practice while 
transforming our observations and perceptions of other beings into our own actions, 
i.e. some genuinely creative artwork.
Observations of the actual functioning of mirror system somehow put our emotions 
and intentions into question – some good or right feelings may not be the governing 
factor in our decision of entering into play scenarios with other beings. Th ere are 
situations in which people decide to do nasty things not in their own interests but for 
certain social, cultural or environmental imperatives; humans and monkeys can be 
harshly beaten or insulted while being trained to master certain new skills. It has been 
discovered that our mirror neurons – when off ered incomplete sensory input – are more 
likely to respond and to predict than making distinctions between actions and true 
thoughts: they are equally charged when we simply imagine doing something, watch 
others carrying it out, and perform it on our own (Gallagher 2006; Kaag 2009). Just as 
a Saussurean sign entity may be used to express the same idea with at least two or three 
diverse forms, so these various acts contribute to the same work out of a certain task. 
Th e existence of a mirror system per se is unfounded among humans – it has to be 
coupled with a sign system so that we appear truly intelligent while dealing with diverse 
tasks. Th e sign-cum-mirror system overcomes the problem that the mirror system 
may in certain cases simply fi re without aft erthoughts. Th is composite system provides 
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us with a new perspective in arguing for our meaningful collaborations with diverse 
beings under all circumstances, including our imagination of nature while roaming 
or travelling (Kaag 2009: 193–194). We now take this as a guiding thread to further 
(1) bridge Hegel’s and Humboldt’s ideas of language and imagination; (2) engage with 
Humboldt’s revised position concerning the usefulness of Hegel’s aesthetics. We will 
observe how certain patterns – more or less emotionally charged if they appear familiar 
at all – cater to our dynamic imagination while we are exploring diverse situations. 
2.3. Symbiosis of our imagination, language, illusion and wellbeing  
Hegel’s systematic inquiry into imagination appears insightful in three ways: (1) 
imagination is thought to be the true content of art that we cannot dispense with; 
(2) associative imagination enables us to play intelligently and passionately “even in 
the most unfortunate circumstances”; (3) productive imagination serves to unify our 
mental images (universal representations or concepts we already acquired) with actual 
or current images (new perceptions) while favouring the former as the guiding principle 
in introducing wider horizons and further unity (Hegel 1993: 51; 2010: 190–192). Seen 
from Hegel’s perspective, the actual functioning of language is not all that diff erent 
from the aforementioned schema he illustrated for the working of our imagination. 
Both speaking and imagining are thought to be a matter of generating signs in our 
consciousness with which we constantly negate some old ideas while pushing for new 
thoughts and propositions (Hegel 2010). 
Hegel’s unifi cation of language and imagination on the same horizons of play appears 
quite enlightening. On the one hand, it sheds some light on the emergence of language: 
our capacity of speaking is thought to rise from “recursion”, a kind of neural connectivity 
governing the imaginative play between mothers and their children (Ellis 2011: 163). On 
the other hand, Hegel’s intriguing statements highlighting the dialectical co-existence 
of our mental and actual images (along with the powerful and demanding trait of the 
former) can be seen to have suggested our dilemma as binocular beings: we always 
struggle between believing and doubting some concrete objects or patterns that we 
actually see. It has been discovered that our mental imagery (mainly shaped by our 
imagination and memory) is able to form a “short-term trace” or memory that guides 
us to measure new experiences or perceptions in the future. Such memory is found to 
be diff erent from iconic memory (which lasts only a few hundred milliseconds) and 
working memory (the content of which easily disappears if we fail to use it frequently) – it 
is much more effi  cient, organized and spontaneous (Pearson et al. 2008: 982, 985–986). 
When dubbed in neuronal terms, Hegel’s idea of universal representations 
corresponds to certain essential traits of mirror neurons. Our mental imagery not 
only governs our levels of consciousness, but also orients us towards aspects of art, 
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nature and culture (instead of imprisoning us in our own towers). It is argued that 
those recursive movements occurring in our short-term memory enable us to carry out 
sophisticated cognitive tasks such as planning and navigating. Meanwhile, we can create 
certain public or shared patterns and repertoires for people to communicate with and 
learn from each other (Donald 2001: 273; Pearson et al. 2008; Ellis 2011: 179–180). A 
certain sense of getting along with diverse beings is actually implied in Hegel’s unifi ed 
view of language and imagination.
How can we use all these merits in order to make the reading of Humboldt’s 
Cosmos useful in our times? Although it is well known that while Charles Darwin was 
considerably indebted to Humboldt, certain evolution theorists and ecologists, e.g. 
Stephen Jay Gould have been quite dismissive of Humboldt’s work: (1) they dismiss it 
as a kind of myth in ecology which entertains a fancy of unity and harmony in nature; 
(2) they think such an idea is simply a kind of belief or moral imperative naively 
expressed before Darwin’s revolution (Gould 2000: 37–40; Paden 2012: 126–128). By 
making prominent certain dichotomies assumed to exist between Humboldt and Darwin 
(belief versus science; harmony versus rivalry in nature), these theorists read Cosmos 
so literally that they have ignored a neuro-psychological scheme that Humboldt aimed 
to achieve for our wellbeing. 
Actually, Humboldt’s contemplations are relevant to aesthetics: (1) those benefi ts 
of unity and harmony that he advocated are defi nitely in our mind – the outcome of 
our mental work – rather than things self-evident or crystal clear in nature; (2) he was 
sketching his own theory of human somatosensory system that serves to boost the 
growth of a new scientifi c approach which values the association between our sensory 
experiences in forming a perfect continuity with our objects of study (Humboldt 2010a). 
He put forward the idea that we equate human beings – irrespective of their historical 
periods, environments, languages and skin colours – on the same continuum made 
up by subtle distinctions in the ways they perceive and play with nature (Humboldt 
2010a: 5–8, 20–21, 350–357). Th erefore, it is somewhat of a disgrace to use Darwin to 
dismiss Humboldt’s theory as an outdated philosophy. Humboldt’s approach actually 
fi nds its compatible and illuminating contexts within hermeneutics, semiotics and the 
kind of aesthetics germane to current neuro-psychological approaches to our capacities.
Th e essential task for us is to refresh our reading of Humboldt’s Cosmos and to explore 
how we can gain something extraordinary in our mind from observing nature – to 
discover if it is in any way similar to how we perceive intricate schemes contained in 
works of art. To begin with, we cannot deny the fact that when exploring wild nature 
or remote lands we tend to associate our new impressions with those of our own native 
environments (Humboldt 2010a: 8–9). Th is can be explained now that we have learned 
something about the functioning of sign-cum-mirror system – it induces us to spot 
familiar patterns for further associative networking in our brain. It should be noted 
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that such a voluntary act achieved when we are moving in nature is charged with an 
even higher level of consciousness than that in interpersonal communications. 
It is so self-oriented and vigorous that Humboldt considers extensive travels as 
the most attractive way to collect data of our sensory experiences. On the one hand, 
these data reveal how we compare and contrast our homelands and certain exotic 
and faraway locations; on the other hand, they serve to excite our imagination so that 
we can go far beyond our temporal and geographical constraints. Th e enlarged and 
extended temporal and spatial schemes fabricated in our mind enable us to develop 
the illusion of being surrounded by certain distant landscapes – as if we were already 
there, acting and moving in situ. Such an illusion – more or less associated with a 
certain euphoric sense of freedom – can remain in the back of our mind for such a 
long time that we are likely to regain the same vision and euphoria years aft er actual 
travels while appreciating certain types of art such as poetry, landscape painting and 
gardening (Humboldt 2010b: 90–91).
Our illusion and happiness of being surrounded by nature may become so demanding 
and persistent – somewhat like Hegel’s idea of universal representations – that it becomes 
our guiding principle in dealing with the arts. Without the constraint of our factual 
and religious beliefs, we can truly appreciate our sensory experiences as a spontaneous 
overfl owing of scientifi c data which to a certain extent reveal the life-giving principle 
in art, nature and culture: certain ways of combining and arranging sensory forms 
actually strengthen the pleasure and excitement we gather from our illusions. Th is is 
the kernel of Humboldt’s aesthetics on the basis of which he sorted out some intricate 
ties between our emotion, imagination and cognition. In addition, Humboldt drew on 
a certain sense of linguistic communication between nature and our mind: (1) remote 
and exotic nature is actually “speaking” to us (addressing our attention) whether we are 
there or simply appreciate its representations; (2) we respond to her or certain skilful 
depictions by developing illusions in our mind (Humboldt 2010a: 7–8). 
By imagining a dynamic process of investing in the two ends of communication, 
Humboldt not only revitalized nature as a living being (no more a naturalist’s artefact 
to be named and categorized), but also equated the actual functioning of our language 
with those of our emotion and imagination – these capacities are all equally powerful 
in shaping our sensory experiences for the growth of illusion and euphoria (Humboldt 
2010a: 355). In addition to reading his brother Wilhelm von Humboldt’s surveys on 
languages, Humboldt actually profi ted from reading Hegel in transforming our language 
faculty as a sensual and imaginative entity that functions to develop some kind of healthy 
illusion. Instead of dismissing Hegel’s and nature philosophers’ work as metaphysics 
deprived of experiences and breadth of vision (“narrower than scholasticism of the 
Middle Ages”, Pinkard 2000: 610) as he would in the 1820s, Humboldt in the 1840s 
decided to adopt some Hegel as part of his writing scheme of Cosmos (Humboldt 
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2009: 67–68). By further introducing the notion of “translation” into our potential 
communications with nature – an idea borrowed from Hegel – Humboldt conceived 
of scientifi c inquiry as a way of unifying nature, our emotions and understandings as 
a compact whole, just like how our mind constantly creates “secret and indissoluble 
links” to integrate diverse thoughts (Humboldt 2010a: 63–64).
Hegel’s and Humboldt’s aesthetics reveal certain lovely paradoxes in our creative 
consciousness. First, we defi nitely need to draw on the past (our memory and mental 
imagery) so as to push for new ideas in the future. Humboldt (2010a: 356) in his 
Cosmos drew on the story of a child travelling between home and nature to prove this 
kind of common humanity (“a beautiful and touching instinct” in his words) – the fact 
that we are not completely attached to the present but constantly move back and forth 
between “the unforgotten past” and “the unknown future”. Hegel also emphasized this 
kind of mental movement: in transcending from the sensory to the absolute, from a 
vague to a profound state of intelligent thinking, we always carry with us the materiality 
of what we have experienced in the past (Hegel 2010: 184). Second, we have a high 
demand for illusions in order to gain some confi dence and happiness. Even though 
we are biologically attuned to geometrical and symmetrical shapes (as argued by the 
philosopher of ecology Ernst Hæckel and the art historian Ernst Gombrich), we also 
need something asymmetrical and impressionistic (such as mysterious and exotic 
landscapes, delicate combinations and juxtapositions of shapes and colours) to satisfy 
our fancy and imagination. 
Th ese two paradoxes are thought to be benefi cial to our creative activities in the way 
of activating our short-term memory. In the course of teaming up with other beings, 
these demands along with certain skills we have acquired enable us to carry out some 
kind of recurring contextualization and revisions with our body and mind. Th ese 
constant comings and goings – each time our mind is ablaze with a new perspective or 
renewed attention to details – are fundamental to the transformation of our emotive-
cognitive composites. 
3. Conclusion: Sign-cum-mirror system considered as 
a medium of bridging the gap between art and nature
While advocating our abilities of observing and experiencing rather than metaphysical 
speculations as a new approach to art and nature, Hegel and Humboldt invited us to 
contemplate the enactive power of our emotions. It appears that emotions (1) enable 
us to imagine something more than actual appearances; (2) may revise our thoughts as 
effi  ciently as the speech acts fi red in our mirror system. According to Humboldt, our 
emotions and languages serve to translate or model the outer world as part of our inner 
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world: they both can be construed as constituents of the dynamic imitation-perception-
action cycle deriving from our sign-cum-mirror system (Figure 1). Broadened and 
contextualized in the scheme of such a system, the actual functioning of our emotions 
regains certain theoretically prominent prospects. 
Instead of dividing emotions into binary oppositions (we may judge certain sensations 
to be right or wrong, decent or indecent, due to our religious beliefs or moral principles), 
we now appreciate them as a continuously wide range of varieties that are bridgeable 
and negotiable if we care to create neural links. In this sense, emotions are just like our 
actions or behaviours – all highly charged with the goal to increase euphoria and new 
understandings by overcoming deep-rooted biases and feelings of fear, anxiety or eeriness. 
It is observed that we can actually achieve such an ideal because of the proximity and 
dynamic links between hypothalamus, amygdala and hippocampus in our brain. On 
the one hand, the hippocampus stores our memory as episodes (including our deepest 
fear and anxiety) and functions to remind us how we should react and behave on the 
fi rst encounters with other beings. On the other hand, the amygdala, which governs 
our primal feelings and sensory experiences, is surrounded by the temporal lobe and 
is able to form extensive links with our cortices (Pessoa 2008). It is argued that these 
incessant links between our (prefrontal) cortex and amygdala serve not only to modify 
the reactions of our hippocampus, but also to nourish our hypothalamus that always 
seeks pleasure and rewards from our actions. Such dynamism is observed to have 
refi ned and enriched our emotions and cognitions just as much as the expanding and 
layering of our cortices (Arbib 2012: 99–101). 
Seen in the context of neural functioning, the sign-cum-mirror system enables 
us to retrieve, select, enhance or inhibit certain feelings and memories for the best of 
our performances here and now (Donald 2001: 191; Panksepp 2012). Such a fl exible 
system on the one hand revises the standpoint that specifi c structures in our brain 
govern our capacities (people can still recall things aft er a complete destruction of their 
hippocampus), and on the other, induces us to imagine our perception-action cycle as 
some kind of architectonic planning. Before applying certain means to draft  a plan, we 
usually have some rough ideas about the items that we want to include. While actually 
draft ing, we can come up with several possible ways of combining these items together 
to fi t in with a certain goal or agenda. We then compare these plans, wondering about 
and estimating the economic and aesthetic values of each plan. We always choose the 
one that appears the most attractive, and then work on cutting and trimming, refi ning 
and enlarging certain features that best characterize the kind of art and culture we 
want to create. We can actually condense the whole procedure, depending on how 
learned and sophisticated we are as a planner, organizer or manager. If we are already 
experienced and skilful, we may be able to envision spontaneously an ideal plan without 
having to start from scratch. 
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We may also acquire some new skills or abilities in the process of actual planning 
because our capacities – rather than remaining disconnected between specifi c brain 
areas – are all structured and interconnected between layers of cortices. Even though 
our primary and sensory cortex is inbuilt with feelings of fear and eeriness that enable 
us to escape life-threatening situations, our ever-expanding secondary and tertiary 
cortices which encourage learning, imagining and planning work to contain these primal 
feelings (top-down regulations) when we enter play scenarios in nature and culture. 
Th e other way round, emotions gathered from our play experiences may change the 
way we perceive art, nature and culture devised by our secondary and tertiary cortices 
(bottom-up evolutionary control; Panksepp 1998, 2012). 
By adopting the Saussurean approach to imagine our emotions and cognitions as 
composites (like chemical compounds charged with valencies), we can avoid being 
trapped in a certain causal reasoning – wondering about which comes fi rst and which 
is more essential. Instead, we choose to be fl exible about their causal links so as to 
observe their qualitative changes in as many diverse situations as possible: (1) a certain 
concept, knowledge or culture is already implied in our spontaneous aff ective reaction, 
i.e. the emergence of the fi rst sign entity; (2) any form of cognition, understanding or 
meaning that derives from our neural processing of the sign is more or less associated 
with emotions; (3) the sign entity is so changing – feelings, emotions and cognitions work 
to modify one another – that we always come up with fresh or revised understandings.
When considered and unifi ed in the light of neural complexities, Saussure, Hegel 
and Humboldt together appear fairly powerful in arguing for the urgency of overcoming 
eeriness on our numerous paths towards linguistic and artistic world making. We cannot 
dispense with the fact that ambiguities or foreboding signs – when spotted through 
our seeing and hearing – actually instigate a rigorous play drive, cognitive or high-level 
processing in our brain (Panksepp 1998: 289–290; Lenzi et al. 2008). Such a pattern 
of neural activity enables us to refl ect on the advantages of using the sign-cum-mirror 
system to engage with the debate on language-ready brain. Instead of simply inhibiting 
feelings of fear and anxiety while we are travelling or socializing, our secondary and 
tertiary cortices always devise changing yet intriguing strategies so that we can cope 
with uncertainties and unpredictability. Both nature and culture can be seen in this 
light as part of our inner biological conditioning that evolves to achieve greater success 
and higher adaptability in diverse situations. 
Just like icons or symbols created by early humans, the invention of la langue can be 
appreciated as one of the strategies that our mammalian managerial brain has devised 
and applied (Donald 2001; D’Errico, Henshilwood 2011). Such an expanded viewpoint 
encourages multidisciplinary inquiries into the conditions of linguistic and artistic 
world making. On the one hand, we should consider various demands of our play drive 
inclusive of imitating beings we are getting along with, devising strategies to collaborate 
with or to get away from them, and gaining happiness, knowledge and confi dence aft er 
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actual communications. On the other hand, all these demands may work to modify 
our somatosensory system so as to improve our performances such as a revision of our 
oral, facial and manual coordination (Arbib 2012: 240–241). 
Our sign-cum-mirror system so to say has not the least interest in identifying an 
absolute origin or a linear development of our faculties and capacities – it rather seeks 
to insert new data or information into our body and mind (Donald 2001: 267–268; 
Th ornhill 2003; Lotman 2011). Empowered by such newly generated information, 
we can go beyond our cognitive constraints of period styles and artists’ biographical 
details while revisiting art history. By taking advantage of the scheme of planning, 
playing and inventing, we seek to enlarge some harmony, euphoria and illumination 
we may gather from selecting, remapping and realigning details appearing in works 
by diff erent artists. Th e emotive-cognitive appeals in this trade may entice us to 
constantly revise some old pathways on our numerous encounters with art and nature.1
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Между эмоцией, воображением и когницией: 
игра как гибридное нейроэволюционное понятие, объединяющее 
Соссюра, Гегеля и Александра фон Гумбольдта
В настоящей статье проводится исследование скрытых связей между «Курсом общей 
лингвистики» Соссюра,  работами Гегеля «Лекции по эстетике» и «Феноменология духа», 
а также «Космосом» Александра фон Гумбольдта. Концепт игры дает возможность 
исследовать связи между эмоциями, воображением и когницией и понять, каким образом 
эти способности в совокупности объединяют в настоящее время концептулизацию 
моделирующих систем, философской герменевтики и психологии морали. Автор 
статьи находит в этих теориях определенную симбиотическую схему, направленную в 
будущее,  затем рассматривает разные точки зрения на эволюцию наших (не)вербальных 
способностей.  Далее приводятся соображения о работе зеркальных нейронов, чтобы 
разъяснить понимание таких невербальных способностей, как чувствование и воображение. 
Предлагаемая нейропсихологами гипотеза о корреляции между зеркальной системой и 
знаковой системой указывает на некоторые существенные точки соприкосновения между 
Соссюром, Гегелем и Гумбольдтом. Наши эмоции и воображение такие же схематичные и 
охватывающие, как и наши речевые акты.  Автор вводит имплицитную знаково-зеркальную 
систему, чтобы разъяснить некторые трудные вопросы, как, например, возникновение 
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мозга с задатками языка/готовностью к языку и потребность преодолеть остранение 
в нашем языковом и художественном творении мира. Предлагается гипотеза, что мы 
применяем свои способности в качестве соматосенсорной системы, чтобы следить, с одной 
стороны, за изменяющейся координацией между телом и духом, а с другой – создавать более 
результативные стратегии для обработки интригующих упорядоченностей в искусстве, 
природе и культуре.
Emotsiooni, kujutlusvõime ja kognitsiooni vahel: mäng kui hübriidne 
neuroevolutsiooniline mõiste ühendamaks Saussure’i, Hegelit ja 
Alexander von Humboldtit
Käesolevas uurimuses püütakse avastada varjatud ühenduslülisid Saussure’i “Kolmanda 
üldkeeleteaduse kursuse”, Hegeli teoste “Sissejuhatavad loengud esteetikasse” ja “Vaimufi losoofi a” 
ning Alexander von Humboldti “Kosmose” vahel. Kõigepealt rakendatakse mängu mõistet, 
uurimaks meie emotsioonide, kujutlusvõime ja kognitsiooni vastastiktoimet ning vaatlemaks, 
kuidas sellised võimed ühendatuna nüüdisajal liidavad kommunikatsiooni modelleerivate 
süsteemide, fi losoofi lise hermeneutika ning moraalipsühholoogia kontseptualiseerimist. Avastanud 
neis teooriates peituva teatava tulevikule suunitletud ja sümbiootilise skeemi, liigutakse uurimuses 
edasi vaatlema teatud vaatenurki meie verbaalsete ja mitteverbaalsete võimete evolutsioonile. Edasi 
tehakse tähelepanekuid inimeste peegelneuronite tegeliku toimimise kohta, et parandada meie 
arusaama selliste mitteverbaalsete võimekuste mõistmist, nagu seda on tundmine ja ettekujutamine. 
Neuropsühholoogide välja pakutud hüpotees peegelsüsteemi ja märgisüsteemi korrelatsiooni 
kohta osutab teatavatele olulistele ühenduspunktidele Saussure’i, Hegeli ja Humboldti vahel. Meie 
emotsioonid ning kujutlusvõime on sama skemaatilised ja laiaulatuslikud kui meie kõneaktid, 
kui need ühendavad jõud erinevate olenditega ning üritavad jõuda uute lahendusteni ning 
sügavamale mõistmisele. Lõpuks lähtub käesolev uurimus implitsiitsest võimendatud märgi-ja-
peegelsüsteemist, et vaadata üle mõningaid vastuolulisi küsimusi, nagu näiteks keelevalmidusega 
aju tekkimine ning pakiline vajadus saada üle kummastavusest meie keelelises ja kunstilises 
maailmaloomes. Tehakse oletus, et me rakendame oma võimeid somatosensoorse süsteemina, 
et ühelt poolt jälgida muutuvat koordinatsiooni oma keha ja vaimu vahel ning teisalt tekitada 
tulemuslikke strateegiaid, mis võimaldavad edukamalt tegelda kunstis, looduses ja kultuuris 
esinevate intrigeerivate korrapärasustega.
